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Executive Summary 
This submission responds to the challenges faced by countries in the multilateral trade 
system of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which have found it difficult to secure much 
needed Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs) during the COVID-19 Pandemic due to 
restrictions in trade of PPEs invoked by Contracting Parties under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
We propose a model WTO GATT clause that will prevent the use of GATT provisions 
(Art. XI:2 (a); Art. XX (b); Art. XXI (b) (iii) and any other provision of GATT 1994 
inconsistent with our proposed Clause) to justify exceptions to restrictions in trade of PPEs 
during a Pandemic or any future Global Public Health Emergency. We envisage that the 
proposed model clause can be used in non-WTO treaties as well. 
 
Keywords: Export Restrictions, GATT 1994, COVID-19 Pandemic, Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPEs).
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A. The Theme of the Submission 
 
Our submission responds to the difficulties faced by countries in the multilateral trading 
system of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) arising from restrictions in trade of personal 
protective equipment (PPEs) imposed by GATT Contracting Parties against other Contracting 
Parties during the ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic. We propose a model WTO GATT clause 
that will prevent the use of GATT provisions (Art. XI:2 (a); Art. XX (b); Art. XXI (b) (iii) and 
any other provision of GATT 1994 inconsistent with our proposed Clause to justify exceptions 
to restrictions in trade of PPEs during a Pandemic or any future Global Public Health 
Emergency. We envisage that the proposed model clause can be used in non-WTO treaties as 
well. 
 
B. Background Context: The Importance of PPEs During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
The importance of PPEs during the current Pandemic cannot be overestimated. 
According to a report by the WTO Secretariat, PPEs which collectively amount to 1.7% of 
world merchandise trade are a subset of medical products that include 
‘…disinfectants/sterilisation products; face masks; gloves; hand soap and sanitiser; patient 
monitors and pulse oximeters; protective spectacles and visors; sterilisers; syringes; 
thermometers; ultrasonic scanning apparatus; ventilators, oxygen masks; X-ray equipment; 
and other devices such as computer tomography apparatus.’ 1 
In 2019, PPEs accounted for 13% of the total imports of medical products within the 
multilateral trade system (see figure 1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The WTO report also showed that total exports of PPEs were valued at $135 billion on 
average for the period 2017-2019 of which about 17% or $23 billion came from China, the 
                                                     
1 See WTO Secretariat, Trade in Medical Goods in the Context of Tackling Covid-19: Information Note, April 03 
2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/rese_03apr20_e.pdf  accessed 09 Aug. 20. 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat 2019 
 
 
 Source: WTO Secretariat 2019 
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top exporter, followed by Germany and the US. These three exporters accounted for more 
than 40% of world exports of protective supplies (see figure 2 below).2 
 
While the search for an effective vaccine against the virus continues, PPEs are essential 
in the global response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. To put this in context, in March 2020, the 
WHO estimated that the global community would ‘require as much as 89 million medical 
masks per month, as well as an additional 76 million examination gloves and 1.6 million 
goggles.’3 To meet these demands, a 40% increase in global production of PPEs is required. 
Unsurprisingly, production and supply of PPEs are still below the global demand.4 There are 
several factors responsible for this shortfall in supply of PPEs. Notably, and of priority to our 
submission is the restrictive trade measures introduced by members of the WTO on the export 
of PPEs.5  The disruptions to supply chains and trade corridors across the world has been a 
significant fallout during the Pandemic.6 This has been most evident in relation to trade in 
PPEs. As such, the primary focus of our intervention is on the trade-related measures 
introduced by WTO member states that have contributed to the PPE shortage. 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 Ibid, 4. 
3 See WHO, Press Release: Shortage of Personal Protective Equipment Endangering Health Workers Worldwide, 
March 03 2020, https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/03-03-2020-shortage-of-personal-protective-equipment-
endangering-health-workers-worldwide accessed 09 Aug. 20. 
4 WHO as of March 2020 was urging industry and governments to increase manufacturing by 40 per cent to meet 
rising global demand.  
5 Panic buying, hoarding and misuse of PPEs has not helped the situation. These trends have negatively affected 
the ability of critical health care workers to access these vital tools in their fight against the pandemic from the 
frontline. 
6 For detailed analysis of the impact of the pandemic on international supply chains see R. Baldwin and E. Tomiura, 
‘Thinking ahead about the impact of COVID-19’, in R. Baldwin, and B. Weder di Mauro (eds.), Economics in the 
Time of COVID-19, (CEPR Press, 2020), pp. 58–70. 
 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat 2019 
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C. Export Restrictions on Trade in PPEs During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
In response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, governments have taken extraordinary 
measures commonly seen in times of war, such as the requisitioning of private company 
facilities to manufacture personal protective equipment for workers on the front lines.7 Several 
countries around the world have also imposed measures on the trade in PPEs intending to 
prevent the exportation of domestic supplies of PPEs. Melaku Desta argues that the recourse 
to these protective measures by major economic blocs such as the European Union (EU) 
during the ongoing Pandemic exposes once again the gaping inadequacy of international 
economic law to curb hoarding or price-gouging practices within national legal systems.8 From 
these developments, it is evident that the global health crisis has activated a self-preservation 
mode of individual nations/regions in the international trade system and has relegated 
‘cooperation in the common interest’ to the back burner. Anthea Roberts and others aptly 
describe this unprecedented era in the international system as a ‘geo-economic world order’, 
where countries place a lot of emphasis on ‘the use of economic instruments to promote and 
defend national interests to produce beneficial geopolitical results.’9 
 
To achieve these goals, WTO members have relied on some or all the following 
provisions of GATT 1994: 
1) Art. XI:2 (a) GATT; 
2) Art. XX (b) GATT, which allows for deviations from WTO obligations in the pursuit 
of the protection of human life and health;10 and 
3) The security exception of Art. XXI (b) (iii) GATT which might come into play as a 
justification clause as well. 
According to the WTO Secretariat, by late April 2020, ‘…it would appear that 80 
countries and separate customs territories have thus far introduced export prohibitions or 
restrictions as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic, including 46 WTO members (72 if the EU 
member states are counted individually) and eight non-WTO members.’11 These measures 
cover a wide range of medical products (including PPEs) and foodstuff (see Chart below).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 See C. Simson, COVID-19 Claims May Test Tribunals With Thorny Questions, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1268760/covid-19-claims-may-test-tribunals-with-thorny-questions accessed 
August 9, 2020. 
8  M. Desta, Covid-19 and Export Restrictions: The Limits of International Trade Law and Lessons for the AfCFTA, 
African Trade Policy Centre Brief, https://www.uneca.org/publications/covid-19-and-export-restrictions-limits-
international-trade-law-and-lessons-afcfta accessed August 9, 2020. 
9 A. Roberts, H. Choer Moraes and V. Ferguson, ‘Toward a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and 
Investment’, 22 (4) Journal of International Economic Law (2019), 655, 656-657.  
10 The Appellate Body in China – Raw Materials established that ‘whenever the requirements of Art. XI:2 
(a) GATT are met, there would be no scope for the application of Art. XX GATT'. See China – Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials AB-2011-5 (WT/DS394-98/AB/R). 
11 WTO, Information Note: Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, April 23 2020, p. 6-7, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/bdi_covid19_e.pdf accessed July 24. 
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In another report,12 the WTO profiled some of the specific measures introduced by 
countries and economic blocs such as the EU to restrict the export of PPEs.13 The EU’s 
measures were preceded by unilateral export restriction measures introduced by EU member 
states – France, Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland that applied to other EU members 
states and third-party countries alike.14 
A major challenge with the use of these GATT measures to restrict the export of PPEs 
is the adverse impact it has on developing countries that are dependent on international 
markets for imports. For example, Signé and Van der Ven estimate that ‘…53 percent of 
African imports originate in countries that have been highly impacted by COVID-19…’15 as 
such they argue that ‘…the Pandemic is interrupting the region’s access to critical products.’16 
With the global production of PPEs concentrated in advanced economies, developing 
countries find themselves in a precarious position. As the WTO Secretariat has pointed out, 
evidence from previous emergencies in the global economy such as the 2008 global financial 
crisis shows that: 
  
…the negative effects of export restrictions can be substantial. This is especially 
true when the country is a large exporter of the good on which the export 
                                                     
12 See Federation of German Industries (BDI), Export Controls and Export Bans over the Course of the Covid-19 
Pandemic: Export Restrictions Impair Ability to Respond to the Crisis, April 29 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/bdi_covid19_e.pdf accessed July 24. 
13 Ibid, 2-3. The EU restrictions where introduced pursuant to regulation 2020/402 which was valid up on till the 
26th of April 2020. See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/402 of 14 March 2020, ‘Making the 
Exportation of Certain Products Subject to the Production of an Export Authorisation’ https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/402/oj  accessed July 24. 
14 See Caroline Glöckle, Export Restrictions Under Scrutiny – The Legal Dimensions of Export Restrictions on 
Personal Protective Equipment, April 7, 2020, https://www.ejiltalk.org/export-restrictions-under-scrutiny-the-
legal-dimensions-of-export-restrictions-on-personal-protective-equipment/   accessed July 24.  
15 See L. Signé and C. van der Ven, ‘How the AfCFTA will improve access to ‘essential products’ and bolster 
Africa’s resilience to respond to future pandemics’, April 30, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2020/04/30/how-the-afcfta-will-improve-access-to-essential-products-and-bolster-africas-resilience-to-
respond-to-future-pandemics/ accessed July 24, 2020. 
16 Ibid.  
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prohibition or restriction is enacted. When a large exporter prohibits or 
otherwise restricts exports of a particular product, the world supply decreases 
and the world price of that good increases. Importers suffer, and in particular 
poor countries with limited production capacity.17 
 
The ongoing issues relating to trade in PPEs is a reflection of broader systemic issues and 
vulnerabilities in the global rules-based trade system. Notably, for several years, the WTO 
system has been struggling with the question of how to strike a proper balance between the 
pursuit of free trade and the need to provide WTO members with sufficient autonomy to 
regulate their domestic issues.18 The last time this question gained momentum was right after 
the global economic crisis of 2008, which forced many WTO members to come up with 
legislation and policies that were aimed at supporting domestic industries for the survival of 
their economies.19 And to this day, WTO members have been relying on the defence of 
necessity.20  
The rationale behind the focus on the interpretation of the term necessity is not far-
fetched. It is to ensure a balance in the world of international trade. It is important to mention 
that the definition of what qualifies as necessity varies from time to time and is largely 
dependent on the status quo and what is obtainable at a certain period of time. And without 
undue flogging, what nations of the world consider a necessity during a pandemic are PPEs. 
Linking this to the debate, the question then becomes a clash between national needs and global 
requirements. This is so because what serves as a necessity to individual nationals is also 
required to protect the world at large. Extensively, what this means is that in the debate or 
conflict between national objectives and the WTO objectives, the latter should triumph.  
The necessity test, as a defence for restricting the import/export of certain goods, is found 
within Article XX (a), (b), and (d) of the GATT and it is one of the most important legal tests 
addressed in WTO dispute settlement system.21 The test is used to justify the general exception 
in these paragraphs of Article XX. For these exceptions to be relied upon, the WTO Appellate 
Body has ruled that GATT requires a State relying on an exception also to achieve the two 
conditions set out in the introductory paragraph (chapeau) of Article XX. The two conditions 
are as follows: no exception should be applied in a manner that would amount to arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries in which similar conditions prevail, and no 
exception should be applied as a disguised restriction on international trade.22 It is along these 
lines that the traditional interpretation of Article XX has been understood to invoke a two-tier 
test. This test requires that ‘the measure must first be justified under one of the Art. XX listed 
exceptions paragraphs (a)-(j), before being tested against the chapeau so as to verify that the 
measure is not applied in a manner which would constitute ‘a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’ or ‘as a disguised restriction on international trade’.23 
However, there has never been a consensus in the jurisprudence of the WTO on what 
                                                     
17 See WTO, Information Note: Export Prohibitions and Restrictions (n 11) 8.  
18 G. Kapterian, ‘Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessity’ 59(1) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, (2010), 89. 
19 Kapterian, (n 18) 89-90. 
20 This proposal is particularly interested in the WTO system ‘necessity’ defense, which is the legal basis that 
underpins the restrictive trade measures relating to export of COVID-19 PPEs. Kapterian, (n 18) 90. 
21 L. Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
Reconstruction,’ 109 (1) The American Journal of International Law, (2015), 95.  
22 GATT 1994, Article XX. 
23 S. Nuzzo, ‘Tackling diversity inside WTO: GATT Moral Clause after Colombia-Textiles’, 10(1) European 
Journal of Legal Studies, (2017), 270; see also Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline (1996); Appellate Body 
Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (2007),para. 139; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products (2014), para. 
5.169; and Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles (2016), para. 6.20. 
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conditions the chapeau has imposed on the general exceptions. The United States – Gasoline,24 
the United States – Shrimp,25 the United States – Gambling,26 Brazil – Retreated Tyres27 and 
EC – Seal Products28 are cases in point to illustrate this lack of consensus. In the United States 
– Gasoline case, for example, the Appellate Body confirmed that this two-tier test aims to curb 
any form of abuse of the GATT Article XX exceptions.29  
Although these defences have been a useful compromise over the years, we find the 
unilateral application of the necessity test by member states to be problematic during an 
unprecedented crisis such as the COVID-19 Pandemic. This is especially problematic for 
countries with low levels of human capital, mostly concentrated in the Global South, who do 
not generally have the infrastructure for the production of PPEs.30 Furthermore, WTO panels 
and the AB have been, in many cases, reluctant to interfere with the decisions of governments 
that are aimed at protecting the health of their citizens.31 In a situation of a global pandemic 
which requires the solidarity of nations, WTO jurisprudence can be said, and rightly so, to have 
failed to cater for the needs of those countries that do not have high levels of human capital to 
produce the relevant PPEs on their own. A critique may, therefore, conclude that WTO 
adjudicative bodies have had difficulty striking a proper balance between domestic autonomy 
and international trade liberalisation.32 
There is a problem in using necessity as the primary metric to gauge the legitimacy of 
any reliance on the exceptions that the GATT provides.33 Necessity is part and parcel of the 
principle of proportionality. This principle has played a critical role in many legal systems to 
check the regulatory freedom of governments. It has been with reference to the application of a 
certain measure by these governments and the question has always been ‘was the application 
of such a measure proportional?’ However, within the WTO system, proportionality has a 
different meaning. Its requirements depend on the actual language that is to be found in the text 
of the relevant provisions. It is not dependent on the application of the measure. 
Simply put the word necessary in Article XX of the GATT implies ‘first and foremost, 
the existence of a link between the measure at stake and the subsequent language of individual 
clauses of Article XX describing the aim as such (‘protect public morals’, ‘protect human, 
animal or plant life or health’ secure compliance’, etc.)’.34 The EC-Asbestos case is illustrative. 
In this case, for the French ban on Asbestos to be necessary/proportional, it was enough to prove 
that they pose a risk to human health and not to prove that the ban actually protected health in 
a manner that was proportional and hence necessary.35  
It is important to note that these exceptions also emerged in the domain of international 
investment law since we are today witnessing an expanding body of BITs that are embracing 
general treaty exceptions. Although these exceptions do not speak directly to health,36 they 
relate to matters touching on the security of states against external threats and internal disorder, 
essential security interests, the regulation of the economy, the preservation of diverse cultures 
                                                     
24 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R). 
25 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/RW). 
26 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
(WT/DS285/AB/R). 
27 Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Rethreaded Tyres (WT/DS332/AB/R) 
28 European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
(WT/DS400/AB/R). 
29 Kapterian, (n 18), 96. 
30 Simson (n 7). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kapterian, (n 18) 127. 
33 Ibid, 94 
34 Ibid, 465. 
35 Ibid, 66. 
36  Simson (n 7). 
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and the preservation and protection of life.37 The most common exception available in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties has been the ‘essential security interests’ exception,38 which is referred to 
as a self-judging-language exception. This language allows a party to take measures that are 
considered necessary for the protection of their essential security interests, without the 
intervention of a tribunal to determine whether such exception applies.39  
There are some other exceptions in international treaties which are also known as escape 
clauses which regularly feature in BITs. They allow for flexibility giving room for member 
states to react at will during certain circumstances. According to Rosendorff and Milner, escape 
clauses or exceptions in international treaties are ‘any provision of an international agreement 
that allows a country to suspend the concession it previously negotiated without violating or 
abrogating the terms of the agreement.’’40 For instance, different countries of the world, mostly 
in the European Union, have employed the provisions of Art. XI:2 (a); Art. XX (b); Art. XXI to 
justify exceptions to restrictions in trade of PPEs during the COVID-19 Pandemic. These 
provisions of the GATT, are included and are expected to be activated under two circumstances; 
first, in an instance where failure to invoke these exceptions will result in serious injuries and 
secondly where there is the presence of overwhelming domestic needs. These provisions were, 
however, not designed in anticipation of a pandemic. The rationale behind the inclusion of these 
provisions in GATT was in response to ‘unforeseen developments.’ Yet, it is quite clear that a 
pandemic that affects all member states is what was anticipated when these provisions were 
written.  
The overwhelming consensus is that the use of export restrictions on PPEs and other 
essential medical products during a crisis of this magnitude is counterproductive.  For example, 
the WTO Secretariat has recently argued that export restrictions rather than solve supply 
shortage, create a negative domino effect because no country is self-sufficient in its production 
of medical equipment, as such, ‘…If every country holds back its goods, no country will have 
all the (medical) products needed to cope with the Pandemic.’41 The report also warned that:  
Export restrictions on personal protective equipment (PPE) can cause production 
abroad to come to a standstill as PPE are required for certified cleanroom production 
– particularly in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. As a result, the worldwide 
production of urgently needed goods, which are particularly required for intensive 
care units in hospitals, could be endangered.42 
To mitigate the adverse effects of restrictive measures on trade in PPEs in the event of a 
future pandemic or global health emergency, we have come up with a model clause discussed 
in the next section.  
 
D.  The Model Clause: Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) – 
Trade-Related Measures 
 
1. This Clause applies in the event of a Public health emergency of international 
concern (PHEIC) as designated by the International Health Regulations Committee 
of the WHO. 
                                                     
37 K. Vandevelde, ‘Rebalancing Through Exceptions’, 17 (2) Lewis and Clark Law Review, (2013), 449–450. 
38 Ibid, 449. 
39 Ibid, 450–451 ff 455. 
40 B. Rosendorff, and H. Milner, ‘The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape’, 
55 (4) International Organisations, (2001), 829, 830. 
41 Export Controls and Export Bans over the Course of the Covid-19 Pandemic: Export Restrictions Impair Ability 
to Respond to the Crisis, (n 12). 
42 Ibid.  
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2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 above, Contracting Parties (Member 
States) shall not introduce measures pursuant to Art. XI:2 (a); Art. XX (b); Art. XXI 
(b) (iii) or on the basis of any other provision of GATT 1994 or of any other 
agreement or provision that has the effect of restricting or limiting or prohibiting or 
banning the exportation or the supply or sale of essential medical products that are 
critical to the public health response of any country in the international system to a 
Pandemic. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not extend to export prohibitions or restrictions 
temporarily applied by a Contracting or Member State that does not have sufficient 
manufacturing capacity to produce essential medical products to fulfil its domestic 
demand as long as those restrictions are otherwise consistent with Art. XI:2 (a) 
GATT 1994. 
E. Justification for Proposed Model Clause 
For Clause D 1, we have proposed a broad definition – Public health emergency of 
international concern (PHEIC) - which captures both pandemics or any public health 
emergencies of a global magnitude.43 Furthermore, due to the technicalities that surround the 
designation of a pandemic, we envisage that the International Health Regulations Committee 
of the WHO is a competent authority to determine the threshold for declaring a PHEIC. 
Clause D 2 is the main operative clause which prohibits the invocation of export 
restrictions under the GATT (or of any other agreement or provision outside the GATT) which 
impair the ability of other WTO members to respond to a PHEIC. Clause D 2 refers to ‘essential 
medical products’ rather than PPEs because we envisage that future PHEICs may have a 
different emphasis on what medical products are essential for responding to the crisis.  
Clause D 3 provides an exception to the operation of this model clause. Here we envisage 
that some WTO member states may genuinely need temporal restrictions during a PHEIC. 
However, we propose that the restrictions must be temporary and applicable to member states 
that cannot produce essential medical products to fulfil its domestic demand. 
Following from the preceding, it is important to note that cooperating for the greater good 
has been integral to international politics and cooperation since the end of the second world 
war. As such, we argue that escape clauses as exceptions should have limitation in invocation, 
especially during a pandemic. As an alternative, we propose limiting the applicability of these 
escape clauses during a public health emergency. We note that the WHO’s International Health 
Regulations Committee that designates public health emergencies such as pandemics is an 
expert body in which member states are represented. This means that a member state can 
challenge such a designation. In effect, the expertise of this Committee can be relied upon to 
determine the availability of the exceptions that are the subject of this proposal.  
The two-fold premise of the proposed ‘pandemic clause’ is that restrictions in the trade 
of PPEs are fundamentally inconsistent with the commitment to free trade in the multilateral 
trading system. One example of such a restrictive regime is the EU’s export authorisation 
requirement for PPE exports outside the Union. 
Second, restrictions in the trade of PPEs needs to be balanced with the interests of 
countries that are heavily dependent on the free trade of PPEs. Major disruptions in the global 
                                                     
43 The term Public Health Emergency of International Concern is defined in the International Health 
Regulations (2005) as ‘an extraordinary event which is determined: 
I. to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease; and 
II. to potentially require a coordinated international response.’ 
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trade of PPEs renders these countries, which also have the insufficient manufacturing capacity to 
fulfil their PPE needs, particularly vulnerable in responding to the Pandemic. 
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